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The defendant was employed as a salesman by an Indiana corpo-
ration which had an inactive subsidiary incorporated in Florida. After
working for some time in Florida under the direction of the Indiana
corporation he was required to enter into an employment contract which
contained a negative covenant not to compete after the termination of
his employment. Subsequently, the assets of the Indiana corporation,
including the employment contract, were assigned to the Florida corpo-
ration; the parties remaining the same as those who preceded the
transfer. The defendant continued to work for the successor corporation
until he resigned and violated the negative covenant in the employment
contract. The plaintiff-assignee sued to enjoin the defendant from trans-
gressing the non-competitive agreement. The decree of the chancellor
granted the relief prayed. On appeal, held, affirmed: the corporation
could assign a particular employment contract to a substantially identical
corporation and have the successor corporation enforce the employee's
negative covenant not to compete. Nenow v. Cassidy, 141 So.2d 636
(Fla. App. 1962).
The modern general rule, which has long been imbued with judicial
acceptance, is that all ordinary business contracts are assignable.'
This principle is subject to various exceptions,' the most universally
espoused of which states that executory contracts for personal services
are not assignable without the consent of the party to be charged.' This
exception has encountered great interpretive confusion with those
tribunals, sitting in cases where an assignee sought enforcement of an
employee's negative covenant, which failed to differentiate between
positive agreements to work and restrictive covenants barring competitive
performance.4
1. See 4 Am. JUR. Assignments § 5 (1936); 6 C.J.S. Assignments § 24 (1937); and
cases cited therein.
2. Uniformly recognized exceptions are those that arise through technical guaranty;
personal relationships, as between master and servant; suretyship; personal skill or
services; personal contractual provisions; and relationships of personal confidence and
credit. Dittman v. Model Baking Co., 271 S.W. 75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
3. The rationale is that it is inequitable to vest in the assignee the right to the
labor of one who has never agreed to serve him. Paige v. Faure, 229 N.Y. 114, 127 N.E.
898 (1920); Seligman & Latz v. Noonan, 201 Misc. 96, 104 N.Y.S.2d 35 (Sup. Ct. 1951);
Texas Shop Towel, Inc. v. Haire, 246 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); 1 WILLISTO,
CONTRACTS § 421 (rev. ed. 1937); 4 Am. JUR. Assignments § 8 (1936); 6 C.J.S. Assign-
ments § 26 (1937). See note 13 infra.
4. "There is a broad distinction between a breach of contract to render personal
services and a violation of a restrictive covenant ancillary to such contract by which
CASES NOTED
Negative covenants of this type5 comprise one of the traditional
common law restraints of trade,8 and present problems that have vexed
the judiciary for more than five centuries.7 They typically provide
that the employee shall not establish a competitive business or attempt
solicitation of old customers for a specified period of time in a designated
geographical area.8
Although the socio-economic climate has been altered considerably
during the evolution of modern society, these covenants illustrate con-
flicting spheres of interest which have remained basically unchangedY
Today, the courts are in almost universal agreement that the validity
the employee agrees not to engage in a competitive business . . . after the contract
with his employer has been terminated." National Linen Serv. Corp. v. Clower, 179
Ga. 136, 146, 175 S.E. 460, 465 (1934). In the former case, the assignee seeks an
injunction in order to compel performance of affirmative personal services under the
employment contract assigned to him. In the latter case, what is sought is the injunction
of the employee's breach of the wholly negative covenant, the paramount purpose being
to protect the employer's business, rather than requiring the employee to perform against
his will. The case of Jack Tratenberg, Inc. v. Komoroff, 87 Pa. D. & C. 1 (C.P. 1951),
points out the employee cannot complain that he is forced to serve one with whom he
has not contracted because the restrictive covenant is activated only after the termination
of the personal employment relationship.
5. Agreements not to compete after a term of employment are to be distinguished
from (1) agreements not to compete during the term of the employment, and (2) agree-
ments of a vendor not to compete with the purchaser of his business. An analysis of
these restraints is beyond the scope of this note.
6. The common law restraints are classified into two groups: (1) restraints ancillary
to valid underlying contracts, and (2) restraints not subordinate to valid underlying
contracts. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 282-83 (6th Cir.
1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 515(e) (1932).
7. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., supra note 6; Pierce v. Fuller, 8
Mass. 222 (1811) ; Smith v. Scott, 4 Paton 17 (H.L. 1798) (Scot.) ; Mitchel v. Reynolds,
1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711) (most cited case on common law restraints) ;
Dyer's Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5, f.5, pl. 26 (C.P. 1414); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1643 (rev. ed. 1937) (early cases of the twentieth century).
8. For definitive studies of the extent of postemployment restraints, see Annots.,
41 A.L.R.2d 15 (1955), 43 A.L.R.2d 94 (1955), where various agreements are differentiated
by duration and geographic extent of the restriction. Covenants which are not qualified as to
time and space are always invalid as an unreasonable restraint of trade while, in most
jurisdictions, those limited as to time but unlimited as to area are also unenforceable.
9. The employer's viewpoint is that these restraints are his only effective means
of business protection against the appropriation of confidential information and customer
followings by the employee. Paradoxically, the provision of special skills and training is
a source of danger to the employer, since competition will be intensified by knowledge
he has imparted. See Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Chand. 133, 56 Am. Dec. 164 (1851); Blaser
v. Linen Serv. Corp., 135 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Martin v. Hawley,
50 S.W.2d 1105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). The employee views the restrictive covenant
as likely to have resulted from an inequality of bargaining power and unreasonably
limiting, both his economic mobility and vocational freedom, since potential competition
may be intimidated. Abalene Pest Control Serv., Inc. v. Powell, 13 Misc. 2d 661, 176
N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup. Ct. 1958). "One who has nothing but his labor to sell, and is in
urgent need of selling that, cannot well afford to raise any objection to any of the
terms in the contract of employment offered him, so long as the wages are acceptable."
Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 411, 180 N.W. 553, 555 (1920). For an
enlightening discussion of both viewpoints, see Blake, Employee Covenants Not to Compete,
73 HAgv. L. REV. 625 (1960).
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and enforceability of post-employment restraints are determined by the
"reasonableness approach,"' 0 and breach of a valid covenant will be
restrained in a court of equity." However, a perplexing dichotomy
of authority ensues when enforcement is sought by an assignee.' 2
In most of those jurisdictions that allow an assignee to enforce the
restrictive agreement of the employee, the covenant is viewed as a
severable asset of the enterprise, 13 distinct from the personal contract
of employment. This conclusion is reached by analogy to the vendor's
covenant, 4 although important distinctions between the two render
the comparison specious.' Inherent in the "severable asset" concept
10. The covenant restraining the employee is valid if (1) it is no greater than is
required for the fair protection of the employer's legitimate interests, (2) it is not so large
in its operation as to interfere with the public interest, and (3) it does not cast
an undue hardship upon the employee. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 513-15 (1932). In
actuality, the particular facts of each case determine how the "rule of reason" will be
applied. Torrington Creamery v. Davenport, 126 Conn. 515, 12 A.2d 780 (1940); Renwood
Food Products, Inc. v. Schaefer, 223 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. App. 1949). See generally Annots.:
119 A.L.R. 1452 (1939); 98 A.L.R. 963 (1935); 67 A.L.R. 1002 (1930); 52 A.L.R.
1362 (1928); 29 A.L.R. 1331 (1924); 20 A.L.R. 861 (1922); 9 A.L.R. 1456 (1920).
11. "Equity will interfere in behalf of the employer and restrain the employee from
gaining unfair advantage . . . for a time reasonably necessary to protect the employer
in his secured business and goodwill . . . ." Blaser v. Linen Serv. Corp., 135 S.W.2d
509, 511 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). See Kinney v. Scarbrough Co., 138 Ga. 77, 74 S.E. 772
(1912); Abalene Pest Control Serv., Inc. v. Powell, 13 Misc. 2d 661, 176 N.Y.S.2d 6
(Sup. Ct. 1958).
12. No cohesive viewpoint is present among divergent theories to be examined in this
note. A possible explanation is that the area of legal publications is surprisingly devoid
of any detailed analytical study on this problem save Comment, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 97
(1951). See note 43 infra.
13. The restrictive covenant is viewed as a valuable business asset severable from
the employee's agreement to work, the benefits of which may be assigned and enforced
by the courts. Jacoby v. Whitmore, 49 L.T.R. (n.s.) 335 (C.A. 1883); Elves v. Croft,
10 C.B. 241, 249 (1850); Torrington Creamery v. Davenport, 126 Conn. 515, 12 A.2d
780 (1940) ; Abalene Pest Control Serv., Inc. v. Powell, 13 Misc. 2d 661, 176 N.Y.S.2d 6
(Sup. Ct. 1958) ; Premier Laundry, Inc. v. Klein, 73 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1947). Severance
is necessary since, interpreting the covenant any other way, assignment would be impossible
due to the fact that the personal employment contract, to which the restraint is appended,
cannot ordinarily be assigned without the employee's consent.
14. An integral part of the sale of a business is the transfer of "good will" assets.
This cannot be effectively accomplished without the vendor's covenant, in which he agrees
not to act so as to lessen the value of the assets he is selling, since the purchaser will
not receive full value unless the business good will remains unimpaired. The covenant is
a valuable protective right in connection with the business and may be assigned
as an incident thereof. Thus, it is equally justifiable to protect a business from sub-
sequent competition by the seller or interference on the part of a former employee.
Jacoby v. Whitmore, 49 L.T.R. 335 (C.A. 1883) (employee's covenant is part of the
business good will); Nelson v. Woods, 205 Ga. 295, 53 S.E.2d 227 (1949) ; A. Fink & Sons,
Inc. v. Goldberg, 101 N.J. Eq. 344, 139 At. 408 (Ch. 1927); Trowbridge v. Denning,
80 N.J.L. 236, 77 At. 1068 (1909); Safier's, Inc. v. Bialer, 93 N.E.2d 734 (Ohio C.P.
1950); Blaser v. Linen Serv. Corp., 135 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Eureka
Laundry Co. v. Long, 146 Wis. 205, 131 N.W. 412 (1911); 5 WILLISTON, Co racrTs § 1643
(rev. ed. 1937).
15. Irrespective of covenants, a sale of good will implies an obligation to effectuate
delivery by refraining from competition, while an ordinary employment contract carries
no such interpretation. Unlike a vendor's covenant, an employee restraint is not a
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is an apparent revitalization of the "blue pencil doctrine"'" propounded
by the English courts where enforcement of a restrictive agreement
would have been barred by an unreasonable restraint.
In some jurisdictions which refuse to accept the asset concept, a
"ratification fiction" arises when the employee continues to labor for
his new master following the assignment.17 This view of implicit assent
to the assignment has been advanced by the American Law Institute
which states:
If such assent is manifested after the creation of a contract,
the assent is similarly effective if it is given for sufficient con-
sideration ... or if, in reasonable reliance on the manifestation,
a material change of position takes place.'
A corollary of the ratification doctrine is the estoppel theory, 9 exempli-
fication of which is limited.
requisite through which the employer reaps the full valuation of the commodity
purchased, since the current services of the employee are not effectuated until after
termination of employment. Principal differentiations are presented in Kadis v. Britt,
224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944); and Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter,
62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d 685, 704 (C.P. 1952). Courts have been more reluctant
to sustain post-employment restraints, and view them with closer scrutiny than those
ancillary to the sale of a business. Morris v. Saxelby, [1916] 1 A.C. 688; Samuel Stores,
Inc. v. Abrams, 94 Conn. 248, 108 Atl. 541 (1919).
16. The English courts would uphold a restraint if its wording was such that a
blue pencil could be drawn through the unreasonable elements, leaving the valid ones
to stand independently and be treated as a separate enforceable covenant. Attwood v.
Lamont, [1920] 2 K.B. 146, 155; Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition
Co., [1814] A.C. 535, 536; Chester v. Nainby, 2 Str. 740, 93 Eng. Rep. 819 (K.B. 1726);
5 WLIsroN, CONTRACTS § 1659 (rev. ed. 1927). While the doctrine of severance has
heretofore been applied only in connection with the reasonableness of a restraint,
its application is nonetheless essential if relief is sought by an assignee since the pro-
verbial "blue line" can be drawn through the nonassignable parent contract-leaving
the restrictive covenant to be transferred as an asset.
17. This theory recognizes the non-severability of the employee's covenant from the
personal employment contract, but negates the distinction by relating the acquiescence
of the employee back to the purported assignment, thus satisfying the non-assignment
rule by imputing consent and recognition of the assignment, effective as of the time of
the original transfer. Nelson v. Woods, 205 Ga. 295, 53 S.E.2d 227 (1949); National
Linen Serv. Corp. v. Clower, 179 Ga. 136, 175 SE. 460 (1934) (new employer is an
equitable assignee); Blaser v. Linen Serv. Corp., 135 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
Texas has also held that continuation of the employment is, as a matter of law, con-
tinuation of the old contract. Thames v. Rotary Eng'r Co., 315 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958).
18. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 162(2) (1932). For an application of this section to
a factual situation identical with the instant case see Jack Tratenberg, Inc. v. Komoroff, 87
Pa. D. & C. 1 (C.P. 1951).
19. When there is an assignment of a personal service contract by the party to
whom performance is due and the employee acts for the assignee with knowledge of the
assignment, such conduct estops the employee from setting up nonconsent thereto and
contending that the assignee cannot enforce the contract. Although this theory is
usually tacitly understood in conjunction with that of ratification, it was positively
expressed in Utilities Ins. Co. v. Stuart, 134 Neb. 413, 278 N.W. 827 (1938) (control by
estoppel if there is no express ratification).
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Some jurisdictions accept neither the asset nor ratification theories,
but advance the novation concept,20 where the continued service of the
employee is viewed as creating a new contract of employment between
himself and his assignee-employer. Though there has not been a precise
ruling on the question, Florida has mentioned such an approach.2'
The most significant of the views entitling the assignee to enforce
the restrictive covenant is one which circumvents the rule against trans-
ferability of personal service contracts where the assignment results
merely from a change in the legal form of ownership of the business.22
Validity and enforceability, in these cases, are correlative to whether
the interests of the employee have been materially impaired by the assign-
ment.23  Also, it has been held that when there is a transfer between
two corporations, there can be no objection on the basis of non-assign-
ment of personal service contracts since "the agreement was made with
a corporation which, in the nature of things, cannot perform personal
functions."24 In those cases where the parties are unchanged following
the transfer, it is held that a technical, but ineffectual, assignment has
been made.25
Those jurisdictions denying enforcement of the employee's re-
20. Although the employee consents to the attempted assignment of his employment
contract, there can actually be none, since the assignee cannot be substituted to a strictly
personal relation. At best, a new contract exists between the employee and his new
master. Pestel Milk Co. v. Model Dairy Products Co., 52 N.E.2d 651 (Ohio App. 1943);
4 PAOE, CONTRACTS § 2258 (2d ed. 1920). "Service is like marriage, which, in the old
law, was a species of it. It may be repeated, but substitution is unknown." American
Colortype Co. v. Continental Colortype Co., 188 U.S. 104, 107 (1903).
21. Orlando Orange Groves v. Hale, 119 Fla. 159, 175, 161 So. 284, 290 (1935).
22. The usual circumstances are the incorporation of a former partnership or a
transfer between corporations situated in different jurisdictions; the parties involved
remaining essentially the same. The prime motivational factor is usually a more con-
venient means of conducting business. Niagara Share Corp. v. Fried, 61 F.2d 740 (2d
Cir. 1932) ; Sands v. Potter, 165 Ill. 397, 46 N.E. 282 (1896) ; Walker v. Mason, 272 Pa.
315, 319, 116 Atl. 305, 306 (1922) (only names changed after the transfer) ; Model
Baking Co. v. Dittman, 266 S.W. 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
23. Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co., 30 Cal. 2d 335, 182 P.2d 182 (Sup. Ct.
1947); Walker v. Mason, supra note 22; Jack Tratenberg, Inc. v. Komoroff, 87 Pa.
D. & C. 1, 12 (C.P. 1951), in which the defendant-employee entered into a written
employment contract, containing a negative covenant not to compete, with Jack
Tratenberg. Four months later, the employer assigned all agreements relating to his
business to the plaintiff (Jack Tratenberg, Inc.). The court held, "The assignment of an
employment contract to a corporation, as here, where the management and personnel
of the employer's business remain unchanged after the assignment, cannot in equity be
regarded as materially prejudicial or disadvantageous to the employe [sic]."
24. Haldor, Inc. v. Beebe, 72 Cal. App. 2d 357, 365, 164 P.2d 568, 572 (Cal. App.
1946).
25. In Gulf States Creosoting Co. v. Loving, 120 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1941), the
appellee-plaintiff formed a corporation and transferred into it all the assets, rights and
liabilities of his business, including a personal sales contract entered into by the appellant.
The court held the apparent assignment was merely part of a transfer of assets to the
successor corporation, and did not fall within the rule denying assignability of personal
contracts. Accord, Model Baking Co. v. Dittman, 266 S.W. 802, 803 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924). See generally 74 tHARv. L. Rv. 393 (1960).
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strictive covenant by an assignee ignore it as a severable asset2 6 and fail
to accept continued employment under the new employer as a ratification
of the purported assignment." While only two jurisdictions28 con-
sistently have denied recovery in the past, the law on this subject
possesses patent inconsistencies within jurisdictional boundary lines.'
Any singular factual situation may be rendered non-assignable, thus
non-recoverable, simply by interpreting the litigated agreement to be
one of affirmative personal service rather than a wholly negative covenant
not to perform.80
In the instant case, the chancellor found that the rights of the em-
ployee were not prejudiced by the assignment of the employment contract
and thus, it was valid. 1 A vital factor was the continuing employment
and management, the parties remaining substantially identical with
those who preceded the assignment of assets to the Florida corporation.
8 2
26. Berlitz School of Languages v. Duchene, [19031 6 Sess. Cas. 181 (Scot. 1st Div.);
Seligman & Latz v. Noonan, 201 Misc. 96, 104 N.Y.S.2d 35 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Avenue Z
Wet Wash Laundry Co. v. Yarmush, 129 App. Div. 427, 221 N.Y. Supp. 506, aff'd, 220
App. Div. 740, 221 N.Y. Supp. 788 (1927); Texas Shop Towel, Inc. v. Haire, 246 S.W.2d
482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Oak Cliff Ice Delivery Co. v. Peterson, 300 S.W. 107 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1927). Basic minority rationale is illustrated by Berlitz School of Languages v.
Duchene, supra, asserting that since a contract of service as a whole cannot be assigned
without the consent of the employee, a particular condition (negative covenant) of that
contract cannot be assigned either.
27. Avenue Z Wet Wash Laundry Co. v. Yarmush, supra note 26; Oak Cliff Ice
Delivery Co. v. Peterson, supra note 26.
28. New York and Scotland.
29. Although the law in New York had, in the past, been very adamant in denying
enforcement of an assigned covenant, recent vacillation is evidenced by the cases of Abalene
Pest Control Serv., Inc. v. Powell, 8 App. Div. 2d 734, 187 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1959), and
Norman Ellis Corp. v. Lippus, 13 Misc. 2d 432, 176 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct. 1955), which point
to a positive rule of recovery tinged with liberality. By the same token, virtually all
recent Texas decisions unequivocally find no inhibition against the assignment of restrictive
covenants, but Texas Shop Towel, Inc. v. Haire, 246 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952),
treated a contract for personal services with a negative covenant appended as unenforceable
and is still good law. A probable explanation is the fact that this problem is capable of
two interpretations which are mutually exclusive; one being a non-assignable personal
service contract and the other being that of a severable, non-service covenant. See
discussion in note 30 infra.
30. All courts recognize the non-assignability of personal service contracts, but those
advocating enforcement by an assignee go a step further by asserting that the assignee is
not seeking to compel the employee to work for him, but only to restrain him from
competing after his duties have ended. Inherent in this view is the severability of the
covenant since without such a procedure, nothing capable of assignment exists and the
negative rule is invoked. National Linen Serv. Corp. v. Clower, 179 Ga. 136, 175 S.E. 460
(1934); Abalene Pest Control Serv., Inc. v. Powell, supra note 29'; Norman Ellis Corp. v.
Lippus, supra note 29; Seligman & Latz v. Noonan, 201 Misc. 96, 104 N.Y.S. 2d 35 (Sup. Ct.
1951) (assignment disallowed); Thames v. Rotary Eng'r Co., 315 S.W.2d 589 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1958); Texas Shop Towel, Inc. v. Haire, supra note 29 (assignment disallowed).
31. Nenow v. Cassidy, 141 So.2d 636, 638 (Fla. App. 1962).
32. As has been mentioned earlier in note 22 supra, circumvention of the assignability
rule has been advocated in those circumstances where the only differentiation between the
assignee and assignor firms is the technical change in business organization. Florida
evidently adopts this realistic view, which emphasizes the solemnity of contractual
obligations, joining California, Illinois, Pennsylvania and Texas, and the Federal courts
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In affirming the decree of the chancellor, the court adopted the
law of Pennsylvania,83 stating, "The incorporation of the employer's
business without other change does not abrogate the contract of employ-
ment, or alter the liability of the parties one to the other. '34 The court
refused to distinguish between an incorporation and an exchange of
stock for assets between two corporations,85 thus facilitating the appli-
cation of the legal principles involved to a unique factual pattern.
Although Florida decisions have not ruled directly on the point involved,
the court noted state authority 6 which propounded both the novation"7
and ratification88 concepts of assignment enforceability. It also rejected
the New York rule of nonassignability89 as nonpersuasive, thus tacitly
recognizing the important distinction between the transaction at bar
and a bare assignment between two separate entities.40
The somewhat unusual factual circumstances before the court
presented a special situation in which there is a unanimity of judicial
opinion in affirming a right of enforcement in the assignee. 41  However,
should a slightly different, and more common situation in which a
transfer takes place between two distinct and different parties arise, the
decision of the court by no means provides a precedent for cases
engendering general assignment issues.42 The law relative to these more
familiar circumstances remains in a state of confusion since the basis
of the Fourth Circuit. Whenever the applicable factual circumstances have arisen, the
circumvention doctrine has been applied.
33. Seligman & Latz v. Vernillo, 382 Pa. 161, 114 A.2d 672 (1955) (change from
partnership to corporation).
34. Nenow v. Cassidy, 141 So.2d 636, 639 (Fla. App. 1962); quoting from 35 Am. JUR.
Master and Servant § 33 (1941).
35. In both a technical incorporation and the transaction in the instant case, if the
individuals involved remain substantially the same as those who preceded them, only a
modification in form has occurred and substantive rights and duties are essentially
identical. It can be argued that bringing the dormant Florida corporation into active
existence created a corporate entity that otherwise would not have functioned, and an
analogous "incorporation" resulted.
36. Orlando Orange Groves v. Hale, 119 Fla. 159, 161 So. 284 (1935).
37. See note 20 supra.
38. See note 17 supra.
39. A bilateral contract involving the performance of personal services cannot be
assigned by either party without the consent of the other. Seligman & Latz v. Noonan,
201 Misc. 96, 104 N.Y.S.2d 35 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
40. The instant case exemplifies that rare instance in which a technical assignment
occurs, but the resultant effect is that of no assignment whatsoever. This is the essence
of the circumvention concept, presented in notes 22 and 32 supra, which: is limited to the
singular type of transaction which took place. Representative language is found in Gulf
States Creosoting Co. v. Loving, 120 F.2d 195, 199 (4th Cir. 1941), in which the court
said "The assignment was merely part of the transfer of assets to a corporation formed
to take over a going business, and after the transfer, the same persons were in control.
Under such circumstances, an assignment of a contract does not ordinarily fall within the
rule that denies assignability where the personal element is a material factor."
41. See note 32 supra.
42. The usual question litigated is that of enforcement of the non-competitive covenant




for decision has not been reduced to a single theory and identical factual
situations may be construed differently depending upon the application
of a certain "rule.
' 4
3
The Florida legislature, departing from a rigid common law ap-
proach,44 has attempted to clarify the interpretation to be accorded
covenants such as the one at bar through a statutory enactment which
reads:
One who sells the good will of a business ...may agree with
the buyer, and one who is employed as an agent or employee
may agree with his employer, to refrain from carrying on or
engaging in a similar business and from soliciting old customers
of such employer within a reasonably limited time and area,
... so long as such employer continues to carry on a like
business therein. Said agreements may, in the discretion of a
court of competent jurisdiction be enforced by injunction.45
Though not considered in the instant case, it is evident this statute
provides a guideline to be set forth when the reasonableness of a restraint
is in question. The greatest remaining difficulty is the determination of
a positive rule of decision applicable to the law of assignments. This
result, though impossible of complete uniformity in the myriad of factual
circumstances litigated, may be attained by adoption of the process of
reasoning the court in the instant case applied to the problem before it.
It is submitted that the basic tenet of the court was, legal refinements
to the contrary, that a transaction which leaves the rights and duties of
the parties unimpaired should not form the basis for an annulment of
contractual relations, voluntarily assumed.4" This is relief by factual
merit rather than recovery based upon rigid application of a rule.
Surely, no more onerous result is reached than when legal dilutions
and finite distinctions bar the satisfaction of an essentially just and
equitable claim. It is hoped the Florida courts maintain their position
when confronted with a similar problem in the future, rather than emulate
some courts who allow themselves to be controlled by a maze of involute
and abstruse "rules" and "exceptions" which becloud the fundamental
interests of the litigants.
MARTIN E. SEGAL
43. Difficulty may readily be foreseen when the imposing array of asset, ratification,
novation, estoppel, personal service and circumvention theories are made the basis for a
supposedly uniform judicial decision.
44. Love v. Miami Laundry Co., 118 Fla. 137, 160 So. 32 (1934) (employee restraint not
enforced). This common law view is still evident in United Loan Corp. v. Weddle, 77 So.2d
629 (Fla. 1955), where a majority of the Florida Supreme Court seemed to ignore the
newer view of the legislature.
45. FLA. STAT. § 542.12(2) (1961), applied in Atlas Travel Serv., Inc. v. Morelly, 98
So.2d 816 (Fla. App. 1957).
46. It is evident that such a view is not limited to a particular area, but may have
a very broad application.
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